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In the last few decades, the eﬀects of cooperative R&D arrangements on innovation and
welfare have played an important role in policy making. The goal of this paper is to analyze
the eﬀects of cooperative R&D arrangements in a model with a stochastic R&D process and
output spillovers. Our main innovation is to allow for free entry in both the R&D race and
the product market. To determine the desirability of cooperation in R&D environments,
we compare three diﬀerent ways of organizing R&D activities: R&D competition, R&D
cartels, and RJV cartels. In contrast with the literature, we assume that cooperative R&D
arrangements do not have to include all of the ﬁrms in the industry. We show that shar-
ing of research outcomes is a necessary condition for the proﬁtability of cooperative R&D
arrangements with free entry. The proﬁtability of RJV cartels depends on their size. The
impact of cooperative R&D arrangements on the aggregate level of innovation depends on
whether there are participants in the R&D race who are a part of the cooperative R&D
arrangement. If some outsiders choose to participate in the R&D race, the aggregate rate of
innovation remains unaﬀected by the formation of a cooperative R&D arrangement. Oth-
erwise, it increases. R&D cartels may be welfare-improving in cases when they cause the
aggregate rate of innovation to increase. In such cases, it may be desirable to subsidize
them. Since sharing of R&D outcomes aﬀects the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the prod-
uct market after the R&D race, the consumer welfare eﬀects of RJV cartels are sensitive
to the speciﬁcation of consumer preferences. Subsidies may be desirable in cases of larger
RJVs since they are the ones which are less likely to be proﬁtable.
JEL classiﬁcation: L1, L4, O3
Keywords: Cooperative R&D; Research joint ventures; Free entry; Uncertain R&D; Tech-
nology spillovers.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyzes the proﬁt and welfare implications of cooperative R&D arrangements
in an uncertain R&D environment with free entry. In the last few decades, the obser-
vation that R&D environments are frequently characterized by substantial spillovers and
appropriability problems has resulted in a growing interest in the impact of cooperative
R&D arrangements on innovation and welfare.1 Despite the possible positive eﬀects of
cooperative R&D arrangements on innovation and welfare, such arrangements pose a dif-
ﬁcult problem for policy makers. This is because, as d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
noted nearly twenty years ago, they represent a hybrid of cooperative and non-cooperative
relations between ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the concern that competing ﬁrms in most R&D en-
vironments may have too little incentives to invest in R&D has caused both the US and
Europe to pass legislation for lenient antitrust treatment of research joint ventures (RJVs).2
Ac o n s i s t e n tf e a t u r eo ft h el i t e r a t u r ee x p l o r i n gt h ee ﬀects of cooperative R&D arrange-
ments is the assumption that the number of ﬁrms participating in both the product market
and the R&D process is ﬁxed.3 It is desirable to modify this assumption and study the
impact of free entry for a number of reasons. First, in many R&D intensive industries,
it may not be realistic to assume that only a limited number of ﬁrms can participate in
the R&D process.4 When ﬁrms cooperate, they aﬀect the expected proﬁts of their rivals
and, hence, may induce R&D race entry or exit. Second, after an R&D process, when the
1The discussion of the adverse eﬀects of R&D spillovers and appropriability problems dates back to Arrow
(1962). Empirically, Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) show that 60% of the patented innovations in their sample were
imitated within 4 years. Mansﬁeld (1985) shows that information concerning development decisions leak out
to rival ﬁrms within about 12 to 18 months.
2In the US, the National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA) of 1993 provides that
research and production joint ventures be subject to a ‘rule of reason’ analysis instead of a per se prohibition
in antitrust litigation. In the EU, the Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 (the EU Regulation)
provides for a block exemption from antitrust laws for RJVs, provided that they satisfy certain market share
restrictions and allow all joint venture participants to access the outcomes of the research.
3For the theoretical literature on research joint ventures, see, for example, Combs (1992), Kamien et
al. (1992), Motta (1992), Suzumara (1992), Choi (1993), Vonortas (1994), Ziss (1994), Poyago-Theotoky
(1995), Leahy and Neary (1997), Salant and Shaﬀer (1998), Martin (2002), Amir and Wooders (1999 and
2000), Amir (2000), Kamien and Zang (2000), Anbarci et al. (2002), and Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002), and
Hauenschild (2003). See De Bondt (1996) for an excellent survey.
4In fact, in the closely related patent race literature, it is common to assume free entry into the R&D
process. See, for example, Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinganum (1985), and Denicolo (2000).
1research outcomes are available to a few ﬁrms only, their resulting competitive advantage
is likely to result in product market exit. However, as spillovers occur and the research
outcomes become available to more ﬁrms, this creates incentives for entry into the product
market.
Hence, allowing for entry into the R&D process and the product market introduces new
strategic, investment, and welfare implications of cooperative R&D. Two other important
assumptions which distinguish our model are the following. First, as in Miyagiwa and Ohno
(2002), we model R&D as a stochastic process. This assumption is in contrast with the
rest of the literature, where, following d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), it is common
to model R&D as a deterministic process.5 Second, we assume that cooperative R&D
arrangements do not have to include all the ﬁrms in the industry. This is in accordance
with industrial practice, but contradicts the previous literature where it is generally assumed
that cooperative R&D arrangements involve all of the ﬁrms in the industry.6
In the model we consider, an R&D race is followed by oligopolistic product market
competition. The winner of the race has exclusive access to a quality-enhancing or cost-
reducing innovation for a limited period of time, after which the innovation spills over
t oa l lo ft h eﬁrms in the industry. The duration of the exclusive access represents the
speed of outcome spillovers. It is aﬀected by the eﬀectiveness of patent and/or trade secret
protection.
Following the literature, we compare the following cooperative R&D arrangements with
the benchmark case of R&D competition, where ﬁrms choose their R&D intensities inde-
pendently. We ﬁrst consider R&D cartels, where a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms set their R&D
investment levels to maximize their joint proﬁts, but do not share their research outcomes.
We show that with free entry, such cooperative arrangements are never proﬁtable irrespec-
tive of the speed of spillovers. This result stands in stark contrast to the results in the
literature, where R&D cartels are always found to be proﬁtable.
5In addition to Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002), three other papers that model R&D as a risky activity are
Combs (1992), Choi (1993), Martin (2002), and Hauenschild (2003). Among these papers, our paper is
closest to Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) in terms of its approach and focus.
6Kamien and Zang (1993) is a notable exception.
2We then consider RJV cartels, where a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms choose their investment
levels to maximize their joint proﬁts and share their research outcomes.7 We show that
such cooperative arrangements may be proﬁtable depending on their size. Speciﬁcally, small
RJV cartels are more likely to be proﬁtable and have higher per-ﬁrm investment levels than
R&D competition while large RJV cartels are more likely to be unproﬁtable and have lower
per-ﬁrm investment levels than R&D competition. This implies that sharing of research
outcomes is a necessary condition for the proﬁtability of cooperative R&D arrangements
with free entry.
While RJV cartels are always proﬁtable to form in papers where R&D is modelled as
a deterministic process, this is not necessarily the case in papers where R&D is modelled
as a stochastic process. Similar to our results, Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) and Choi (1993)
also qualify the conclusions of the deterministic R&D literature. Speciﬁcally, Miyagiwa and
Ohno (2002) show that with uncertain R&D, the proﬁtability and welfare implications of
RJV cartels depend on the level of spillovers and the eﬀect of sharing on industry proﬁts.
Choi (1993) ﬁnds that RJV cartels may be unproﬁtable because he assumes that sharing
decreases product market payoﬀs. In comparison with these two papers, we show that when
markets are characterized by free entry, the key variable for RJV cartel performance is its
size. Hence, our ﬁndings can be used to explain why RJVs often do not include all of the
ﬁrms in an industry and why ﬁrms choose to conduct many R&D projects non-cooperatively.
Our analysis further reveals that the impact of cooperative R&D arrangements on the
aggregate level of innovation depends on whether there are participants in the R&D race
who are not a part of the cooperative R&D arrangement. If the size of the cartel is such
that some outsiders choose to participate in the R&D race, the aggregate rate of innovation
remains unaﬀected by the formation of a cooperative R&D arrangement. In such cases,
R&D cartels are still welfare-reducing because they are unproﬁt a b l e . I ft h es i z eo ft h e
cartel is such that no outsider participants choose to participate in the R&D race, the
aggregate rate of innovation is higher with a cooperative R&D arrangement than without.
7Firms do not cooperate in the product market in either of these arrangements.
3In such cases, R&D cartels may be welfare-improving because of their positive impact on
consumer welfare.
Whether there are outsider participants in the R&D race or not, the impact of RJV
cartels on consumer welfare depends on consumers’ preferences. Although there are more
ﬁrms in the market with the new technology under an RJV cartel, since this causes more
ﬁrms with the old technology to exit, consumers also have access to less variety. RJV cartels
may be socially desirable depending on which eﬀect dominates, which implies that antitrust
policy towards RJV cartels should be sensitive to consumers’ preferences.
Hence, our results in general imply that there may be a case for subsidizing R&D cartels
without outsider participants in the R&D race and RJV cartels with or without outsider
participants in the R&D race because they may be unproﬁtable but welfare improving. This
conclusion is almost unique in the literature where, since R&D cartels are generally found
to be proﬁtable, it is never necessary to subsidize them.8 RJV cartels are also found to
be more proﬁtable than and welfare superior to R&D competition in the literature with
deterministic R&D and a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. Moreover, they are most proﬁtable when
they include all of the ﬁrms in the industry.9 This contrasts with our results, which imply
that subsidies may be desirable precisely in cases of larger RJVs since they are the ones
which are less likely to be proﬁtable. This result also diﬀers from those in the literature
with stochastic R&D and a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, where the welfare implications of RJV
cartels depend on the level of spillovers.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the details of the model. Section
3 presents the product market payoﬀs which we use in Sections 4, 5, and 6 in the analysis of
R&D competition, R&D cartels, and RJV cartels respectively. Section 7 explores the welfare
and policy implications of the cooperative R&D arrangements we consider. In Section 8,
we extend the analysis by considering the eﬀects of cooperative R&D arrangements when
the cooperating ﬁrms face no competition from outsider participants in the R&D race in
8For example, Leahy and Neary’s (1997) states that ‘policy intervention to encourage cooperation is likely
to be redundant whether or not it is desirable.’
9See Kamien and Zang (1993).
4equilibrium. We conclude and make suggestions for future research in Section 9.
2 The Model
Consider a continuous-time model where initially symmetric ﬁrms compete both in a prod-
uct market and an R&D race for a new technology. There is free entry and exit in both the
product market and the R&D race. We assume that the product market is in a long-run
equilibrium when an opportunity for a new technology arises. Firms can compete either
individually or jointly to be the ﬁrst to develop the new technology, which may be either a
quality-enhancing or a cost-reducing innovation.
We model research activity using a Poisson discovery process. Each ﬁrm operates an
independent research facility. We allow both incumbent ﬁrms and new ﬁrms to participate
in the R&D race. All participants must incur a one-time entry cost of S to enter the race.
The entry cost represents the race-speciﬁc ﬁxed-cost expenditure. Firms share a common
discount rate r. Following Lee and Wilde (1980), we assume that the participants in the race
choose an R&D investment x and incur a ﬂow cost x per unit of time. Investment provides
a stochastic time of success that is exponentially distributed with hazard rate h(x).W e
assume that h0 (x) > 0, h00 (x) < 0,a n dh(0) = 0. lim
x→0
h0 (x) is suﬃciently large to guarantee
an interior equilibrium and lim
x→∞h0 (x)=0 .
Following the literature, we consider the following three scenarios. Under R&D com-
petition, the ﬁrms conduct research independently. They make their R&D and production
decisions to maximize their individual payoﬀs. With an R&D cartel, a set C = {1,...,C}
of ﬁrms, which are exogenously designated to be part of the cartel, choose their R&D in-
vestments to maximize their joint proﬁts. The cartel members do not share their research
outcomes and compete in the product market. With an RJV cartel, a set J = {1,...,J}
of ﬁrms, which are exogenously designated to be part of the cartel, choose their R&D in-
vestments to maximize their joint proﬁts and all participants in the cartel acquire the new
technology when and if one of the cartel’s members wins the race. After sharing the new
technology, the ﬁrms compete in the product market.
5We let R ={1,...,R} denote the set of all ﬁrms which choose to participate in the race.
In Sections 5 and 6, we ﬁrst consider the case when R is strictly greater than the number
of ﬁrms which cooperate. In other words, we assume that some outsiders always ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to compete in the race. We later relax this assumption in Section 8.
The winner of the race has exclusive rights to the use of the new innovation for a duration
of T, after which time all ﬁrms immediately gain free access to the new technology. As stated
in Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002), T can be interpreted as the speed of outcome spillovers.
It is likely to be aﬀected by the length and breadth of patent protection as well as the
technological ease of reverse engineering.
In the product market, we assume that all ﬁrms incur ﬁxed costs of production as long
as they continue to produce. In other words, the ﬁxed costs of production are an ongoing
expense, not a one-oﬀ commitment. Payments on a renewable lease, utility fees, and head
oﬃce costs are examples of these types of ﬁxed cost.10
We make the following assumptions regarding the product market payoﬀs and use the
following notation. We let Nt stand for the number of ﬁrms active in the product market
at time t. Firms can choose to be active or inactive in the product market at every instant
in the game. During the race, there continues to be free entry into the product market. All
ﬁrms in the product market earn ﬂow proﬁts πo (Nt) net of ﬁxed costs of production, where
the superscript o stands for the old technology. However, ﬁrms do not need to be active in
the product market to be able to participate in the R&D race.
We let W stand for the number of winners at the end of the race. Hence, Nt −W stand
for the number of active ﬁrms with the old technology in the market. After the R&D race
ends but before the innovation spills over to the other ﬁrms in the industry, πw (W,Nt − W)
and πf (W,Nt − W) denote the ﬂow proﬁts, net of ﬁx e dc o s t s ,e a r n e db yaﬁrm with the
new technology and a ﬁrm with the old technology, respectively. Hence, if a single ﬁrm wins
the race, that ﬁrm earns πw (1,N t − 1) while if an RJV cartel wins the race, each member
of the RJV cartel earns πw (J,Nt − J).W ea s s u m e
10This can be seen as a long run approximation to an industry where some costs are sunk in the short
run.
6Assumption 1 πw (W,Nt − W) >π f (W,Nt − W).
Hence, the ﬁrms with the new technology earn more than the ﬁrms with the old tech-
nology. Such an assumption holds in standard Cournot and diﬀerentiated good Bertrand
models. After T periods, the innovation spills over and the ﬁrms’ ﬂow proﬁts become
πn (Nt) if they are active, where the superscript n stands for the new technology, and zero
otherwise.
We assume that all proﬁt functions are decreasing in the level of competition, represented
in the following two assumptions by the number of ﬁrms with the new technology and the
total number of ﬁrms in the market, respectively.
Assumption 2 πw (W,Nt − W) and πf (W, Nt − W) are decreasing in W.
Assumption 3 All product market payoﬀs are decreasing in Nt.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows.
Stage 1: The product market is in a long-run equilibrium. An opportunity for the
development of a new technology arises.
Stage 2: The cooperative R&D structure is determined exogenously.
Stage 3: All ﬁrms, whether active in the product market or not, decide whether to incur
a ﬁxed cost S to enter the R&D race. Those ﬁrms which are active in the product market
earn ﬂow proﬁts πo (Nt).
Stage 4: The R&D race ends as soon as one of the ﬁrms develops the new technology.
After a ﬁrm wins the race but before spillovers occur, all ﬁrms with the new technology
earn a ﬂow payoﬀ of πw (W, Nt − W) while all other active ﬁrms earn πf (W, Nt − W) for
duration T.
Stage 5: After a duration of T,a l lﬁrms gain access to the new technology and earn ﬂow
payoﬀso fπn (Nt) if they produce.
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game using backward induction.
73 Product Market Competition
To determine the payoﬀs to the winners and losers of the R&D race, we start the analysis
by considering the product market competition after the race has ended. Note that the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the product market changes only when there is a change in
the technological environment. Hence, after the innovation spills over to all of the ﬁrms in
the industry, entry occurs until πn (Nt)=0and the ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts thereafter.
There is exit from the product market immediately after the race ends since the presence
of one or more ﬁrms with a better technology makes it unproﬁtable for (at least) some of the
ﬁrms that were in the market before the race came to an end to continue to produce. If the
innovation is not drastic, the remaining ﬁrms without access to the new technology continue
to produce using the old technology. Since exit happens instantaneously, the remaining ﬁrms
in the market immediately start to earn either πw (W,Nt − W) or πf (W,Nt − W). Hence,
after the R&D race ends but before spillovers take place, there are W ﬁrms in the market
with the new technology. Nt is equal to W if the innovation is drastic. If the innovation is
not drastic, the number of ﬁrms which are producing using the old technology is determined
by πf (W,Nt − W)=0 .
4 R&D Competition
In this section we consider the benchmark case where the ﬁrms conduct R&D independently.
We show that there exists a free entry equilibrium to the R&D competition game, and
characterize the investment choices and the number of ﬁrms in this equilibrium.
With a Poisson discovery process, the probability that there has not been a discovery







. Conditional on this probability, each participant
earns a ﬂow proﬁto f(πo (Nt) − xi)dt during the interval dt if they are active in the product
market and −xidt otherwise. Since the product market is in a long-run equilibrium at the
beginning of the game and the decision to be active in the product market is independent
of the decision to be active in the R&D race, the number of ﬁrms in the market, Nt,d o e s
not change until the race ends and is given by πo (Nt)=0 .
8If ﬁrm i innovates during the interval dt, its earnings for the period T are
T Z
0
e−rtπw (1,N t − 1)dt.( 1 )
As explained in Section 3, after the innovation arrives, Nt does not change until the end of
the period T. Hence, using NR to denote the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the product











If another ﬁrm innovates during the interval dt, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is equal to zero due to the
assumption of free entry and exit. Even after the spillovers occur and ﬁrm i gains access to
the new technology, since entry takes place until the product market proﬁts are driven to
zero, ﬁrm i continues to make zero.
We can now write down the present discounted value of the sum of ﬁrm i’s expected



















h(xj) stands for the aggregate hazard rate of the rival ﬁrms.
Given the memoryless nature of the Poisson process, ﬁrm i takes αi as given and chooses









− [r + h(xi)+αi]=0 .( 4 )
The second-order condition is
h00 (xi)
∙





< 0,( 5 )
which is always satisﬁed because of the concavity assumption on h(xi). Hence, the ﬁrst-
order condition implicitly deﬁnes the optimal choice of xi as a function of the rival ﬁrms’
investment choices.
9Since all of the ﬁrms are symmetric, we look for a symmetric equilibrium. The equi-
librium per-ﬁrm investment levels and number of ﬁrms can be determined by solving the
ﬁrst-order condition of a generic ﬁrm and the zero proﬁt condition simultaneously. To show
that there exists a free entry equilibrium, we need to show that the expected proﬁts at the
beginning of the R&D race are decreasing in the number of ﬁrms.









∂xi =0 . The following lemma states how a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm’s payoﬀ changes
with αi.
Lemma 1 The expected payoﬀ of a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm i that is active in the R&D race
decreases monotonically with the value of αi.




r − b x(αi)
¤
[r + h(b x(αi)) + αi]
2 < 0.( 6 )
To determine the sign of ∂αi
∂R,t a k i n gR as given, let x represent the symmetric solution
to the ﬁrst-order conditions. It satisﬁes the following equation.
x = b x((R − 1)h(x)),( 7 )
where b x stands for the best response function. Note that at a symmetric equilibrium,





− S.( 8 )
We ﬁrst analyze the slope of the best response function of ﬁrm i. Using the implicit











L + b x + L
r αi
¤.( 9 )














=0 .( 1 0 )
From (3), we have πi + S = [h0(xi)L
r −1]




h0 (xj)h0 (b x)(πi + S)
h00 (b x)
£
L + b x + L
r αi
¤,( 1 1 )
which is > 0 since h00 (xi) < 0. Hence, the investment choices of the ﬁrms are strategic
complements.









1 − ∂e x
∂(R−1)h(x) (R − 1)h0 (x)
.( 1 2 )
The numerator of this expression is positive because the investment decisions of the ﬁrms
are strategic complements. Following Lee and Wilde (1980), we deﬁne the expression in the
denominator as a stability condition. Hence, it is also positive and ∂x
∂R > 0.T h i s i m p l i e s
∂α
∂R > 0 and we can now state the following result.
Proposition 1 There exists a free entry equilibrium to the R&D competition game where
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, R∗, is determined by V ∗ = V (R∗)=0 . Each of these R∗
ﬁrms invests x∗ = x(R∗).
5R & D C a r t e l
In this section, we compare the case of R&D competition with the case where a group of C
ﬁrms form an R&D cartel. The cartel members participate in the R&D race by choosing
their investment levels to maximize their joint payoﬀs, but they do not share their research
outcomes. Hence, as in the case of R&D competition, each ﬁrm i in the cartel earns L
r only
in the case when it wins the race. We assume that due to free entry in the R&D race, the
cartel participants still face competition from outsider participants in the race.


















⎠,( 1 3 )
where C is the set of ﬁrms participating in the R&D cartel, L is as deﬁn e di n( 2 ) ,a n d
the last term in the denominator,
P
k/ ∈C
h(xk), stands for the sum of the hazard rates of the
outsider participants in the race. Each outsider maximizes the payoﬀ f u n c t i o ng i v e ni n( 3 ) .
We look for a symmetric equilibrium, where each cartel member invests xC, each outsider
participant invests xO,a n dRC stands for the number of participants in the R&D race.























































=0 ,( 1 5 )





r + Ch(xC)+( RC − C)h(xO)
− S =0 (16)
simultaneously.11
The following proposition establishes that there exists a free entry equilibrium with an
R&D cartel. As in the case of R&D competition, the result relies on a stability condition
speciﬁed in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 There exists a free entry equilibrium with an R&D cartel.
Proof. See Section 1 in the Appendix.
11It is straightforward to verify that the second-order conditions hold because of the concavity assumption
on h(xi).
12To determine the proﬁtability of R&D cartels and their impact on innovation, we start
by comparing the per-ﬁrm investment level under R&D competition with the per-ﬁrm in-
vestment level in an R&D race with an R&D cartel. The following proposition establishes
that while the cartel participants reduce their per-ﬁrm investment level, the outsider par-
ticipants invest the same amount as they do under R&D competition.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, the per-ﬁrm investment level of the R&D cartel participants,
xC, is lower than the per-ﬁrm investment level under R&D competition, x∗.T h ei n v e s t m e n t
level of outsider ﬁrms in the R&D race with an R&D cartel, xO,i se q u a lt ox∗.
Proof. See Section 2 in the Appendix.
With free entry in the product market, R&D investments always confer a net negative
externality on rivals. Outcome spillovers do not provide any beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrms that lose
the R&D race because any future rents that could be earned by using the new technology
are dissipated through entry into the product market. This transforms the R&D race into a
winner-takes-all game. Since th eR & Dc a r t e lm e m b e r si n t e r n a l ize the negative externality
they impose on each other, they invest less than the outsider participants in the race.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we use Lemma 1 to show that all outsider ﬁrms invest the
same amount in the presence of an R&D cartel as they do under R&D competition. Since
in both cases the outsider ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium, Lemma 1 implies that they
face the same proﬁt maximization problem and choose the same solution.
Comparing these results with those of Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) reveals the importance
of the assumption of free entry. If there are barriers to entry in the product market, the
losers of the R&D race still get a chance to beneﬁt from the innovation after spillovers
happen. For suﬃciently small values of T (i.e., for suﬃciently rapid spillovers), this positive
spillover eﬀect outweighs the negative competitive eﬀect mentioned above and, thus, R&D
investments confer a net positive externality on the rival ﬁrms. Hence, Miyagiwa and Ohno
(2002) ﬁnd that for suﬃciently small T values, when ﬁrms form an R&D cartel that allows
them to internalize these positive externalities, they end up increasing their investment
13levels above the investment level under R&D competition.12
Ultimately, what is important is the impact of the R&D cartel on the aggregate arrival
rate of innovation. The conclusion in the literature is that R&D cartels decrease the ag-
gregate rate of innovation for suﬃciently low spillovers and increase it for suﬃciently high
spillovers. This follows immediately from the per-ﬁrm investment results discussed above
since it is generally assumed that all ﬁrms participate in the R&D cartel. In our context,
due to the assumption of free entry, one cannot readily use the results on the changes in
the individual investment levels to determine the impact of R&D cartels on the aggregate
rate of innovation. Instead, we proceed in the following way. Since there are outsider ﬁrms
in the R&D race, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation is equal to h(xi)+αi from the
perspective of any outsider ﬁrm i. Since the outsider ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts both with an
R&D cartel and under R&D competition, Lemma 1 implies that αi i st h es a m ei nb o t h
cases. From Proposition 3 we know that xi = x∗ in both cases also. Hence, the aggregate
rate of innovation is the same in both cases. This implies that the total number of ﬁrms
participating in the R&D race must be higher with an R&D cartel than under R&D com-
petition. That is, since xC <x O and xO = x∗,m o r eﬁrms must be investing with an R&D
cartel to achieve the same level of aggregate innovation as under R&D competition.
The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 4 In an R&D environment with an R&D cartel,
(i) the aggregate arrival rate of innovation is the same as under R&D competition;
(ii) a higher number of ﬁrms participate in the R&D race than under R&D competition.
With a ﬁxed number of participants in the R&D race, the formation of an R&D cartel
would cause the outsider ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts to increase because the R&D cartel members
invest less than they do under R&D competition. With free entry into the R&D race,
the increase in the expected proﬁts of the outsider ﬁrms invites entry into the race until
12This result is in line with the results of the other papers in the literature that model R&D as a deter-
ministic process. If the rate of spillovers is suﬃciently high, the positive externality they generate outweighs
the negative externality generated by competition. See, for example, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
and Kamien et al. (1992).
14the expected proﬁts are driven down to zero. Proposition 4 implies that the entrants’
investment level exactly compensates for the decrease in the investment level of the R&D
cartel members.
We ﬁnally evaluate the proﬁtability of R&D cartels.
Proposition 5 All R&D cartels are unproﬁtable.
Proof. Each member of the R&D cartel and each outsider ﬁrm face RC − 1 competitors
in equilibrium. Of these, RC − 2 competitors are the same for these two type of ﬁrms.
However, an R&D cartel member’s RC − 1th competitor is an outsider ﬁrm investing x∗
while the outsider ﬁrm’s RC −1th competitor is an R&D cartel member investing xC <x ∗.
Hence, the value of αi faced by a member of the R&D cartel is higher than the value of αi
faced by an outsider. By Lemma 1, this implies that the outsider ﬁr mw o u l de a r nah i g h e r
proﬁt than the R&D cartel member if both ﬁrms maximized their individual proﬁts. The
R&D cartel member earns even less since it does not maximize its individual proﬁts.
This result also contrasts with the results in the previous studies of R&D cartels, which
consistently ﬁnd that the joint proﬁts of the ﬁrms within an R&D cartel are higher than
their joint proﬁts under R&D competition.13 In our analysis, free entry into the R&D
race makes otherwise proﬁtable R&D cartels unproﬁtable. This is because the members of
an R&D cartel earn less than the outsider participants in the race because of a free rider
eﬀect.14 The outsider ﬁrms beneﬁt from the lower investment of the cartel members because
it increases their probability of success. Since the outsiders earn zero and the R&D cartel
members earn less, the R&D cartels are unproﬁtable in equilibrium.15
13Again, see, for example, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), and Miyagiwa and
Ohno (2002).
14A similar kind of free rider eﬀect exists in the mergers literature. See Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere
and Davidson (1985).
15Erkal and Piccinin (2006) and Davidson and Mukherjee (2007) show that free entry in the product
market makes otherwise proﬁtable product market mergers unproﬁtable.
156R J V C a r t e l
We next consider the case where an exogenously-determined group of J ﬁrms participate
in the R&D race by forming an RJV cartel. The ﬁrms make their R&D decisions jointly
and gain immediate access to the new technology in the event that any one of them wins
the race.






















⎠,( 1 7 )
where the last term in the denominator stands for the sum of the hazard rates of the outsider








where NJ stands for the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the product market during the




the number of participants in the RJV cartel because the winner shares the new technology
with the rest of the cartel, which determines the number of ﬁrms in the product market
with the new technology for the period T.
We start the analysis by establishing that, as in the case of R&D competition and
R&D cartels, there exists a free entry equilibrium with an RJV cartel where each cartel
member invests xJ, each outsider participant invests xO,a n dRJ stands for the number
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r + Jh(xJ)+( RJ − J)h(xO)
− S =0 .16 (21)
As in the case of R&D competition and R&D cartels, the result relies on a stability condition
speciﬁed in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 There exists a free entry equilibrium with an RJV cartel.
Proof. See Section 3 in the Appendix.
The diﬀerence between an RJV cartel and an R&D cartel is the product market payoﬀ
the members receive when one of the cartel participants wins the R&D race. Hence, to
determine the proﬁtability of RJV cartels and their impact on innovation, we ﬁrst explore
how the equilibrium per-ﬁrm investment and proﬁt levels of an RJV cartel change with LJ.
While analyzing the impact of an increase in LJ, one has to take into account its eﬀect on
the entry and investment decisions of the outsider participants in the R&D race also. We
have the following result.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium per-ﬁrm investment and proﬁt levels of an RJV cartel of size J
are monotonically increasing in LJ.
Proof. See Section 4 in the Appendix.
We next evaluate the performance of an RJV cartel for low and high values of LJ to be
able to draw conclusions for the range of possible RJV cartel eﬀects. The following lemma
presents results for the cases when LJ = L
J and LJ = L.
Lemma 3 If LJ = L
J, in equilibrium the members of the RJV cartel invest less than x∗,
the per ﬁrm investment level under R&D competition, and make a lower proﬁt than they
would under R&D competition. If LJ = L, in equilibrium the members of the RJV cartel
invest more than x∗ and make a higher proﬁt than they would under R&D competition.
16It is straightforward to verify that the second-order conditions hold because of the concavity assumption
on h(xi).
17Proof. See Section 5 in the Appendix.
In the comparison of the per-ﬁrm investment levels in an environment with an RJV cartel
and in an environment with R&D competition, two eﬀects play a role. First, while ﬁrms
inﬂict negative externalities on each other under R&D competition, members of RJV cartels
confer positive externalities on each other because they share their research outcomes. Joint
proﬁt maximization allows the cartel participants to internalize these positive externalities,
which causes the per-ﬁrm investment level to increase. Second, the per-ﬁrm returns to
winning when the ﬁrms are part of an RJV cartel diﬀer from those under R&D competition
because when a member of the RJV cartel wins the R&D race, all its members have access
to the new technology. When LJ = L
J, the returns with an RJV cartel are lower than the
returns under R&D competition, which are equal to L.T h i sa ﬀects the per-ﬁrm investment
level with an RJV cartel adversely. Lemma 3 implies that when LJ = L
J, this negative
eﬀect dominates the positive eﬀect and, hence, the members of the RJV cartel invest less
than they would under R&D competition and make lower proﬁts. On the other hand, when
LJ = L, the returns to winning are the same under both arrangements and the ﬁrst eﬀect
causes the per-ﬁrm investment and proﬁt level to be higher with an RJV cartel.
In papers which model R&D as a deterministic process, RJV cartels are always proﬁtable
a n dr e s u l ti na ni n c r e a s ei nt h el e v e lo fi n v e s t ment because of spillovers and joint-proﬁt
maximization. In contrast, in papers which model R&D as a stochastic process, RJV
cartels may not always be proﬁtable. Choi (1993) ﬁnds that RJV cartels may be unproﬁtable
because in his model sharing of R&D outcomes increases product market competition. Such
an assumption is not required for our results. Indeed, in our framework, it is possible for
sharing of R&D outcomes to increase industry proﬁts since it can also reduce the total
number of participants in the product market.17 RJV cartels may be unproﬁtable even
in those cases when sharing increases industry proﬁts because of free entry in the R&D
race. In contrast, Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) ﬁnd that if industry proﬁts increase with the
sharing a new technology, the members of a RJV cartel must be making higher proﬁts than
17Note that even though we allow for outsiders and entry, industry proﬁts are still equal to the total proﬁts
made by the cartel members since the outsiders make zero proﬁts.
18they would under R&D competition.
As far as RJV cartels and R&D cartels are concerned, we point out in the proof of Lemma
3 that when LJ = L
J, an RJV cartel and an R&D cartel of the same size would result in the
same level of per-ﬁrm investment and would earn the same proﬁts in equilibrium. Together
with Lemma 2 this implies that for LJ > L
J, ﬁrms make higher investments and higher
proﬁts in an RJV cartel than in an R&D cartel.
Using Lemmas 2 and 3, we can establish the existence of two critical values, b LJ (J)
and e LJ (J), such that the per-ﬁrm proﬁt and investment levels will be higher with an
RJV cartel than under R&D competition if LJ > b LJ (J) and LJ > e LJ (J) respectively.
Establishing that b LJ (J) < e LJ (J), the following proposition presents a characterization of
the performance of R&D environments with RJV cartels based on LJ.




, the members of
an RJV cartel invest higher amounts and make higher proﬁts than they would under R&D
competition. For values of J such that LJ ∈
h
b LJ (J), e LJ (J)
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, the members of an RJV cartel
invest lower amounts and make higher proﬁts than they would under R&D competition. For




, the members of an RJV cartel invest lower
amounts and make lower proﬁts than they would under R&D competition.
Proof. See Section 6 in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 implies that if the per-ﬁrm investment level is higher with an RJV cartel,
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt h ep e r - ﬁrm proﬁt level is also higher. The reason that the ﬁrms
may be making higher proﬁts even if their investment levels are lower than they would be
if they were not cooperating is that they beneﬁt from each other’s investment levels. Being
a member of the RJV cartel provides them with insurance in that they start to earn LJ as
soon as any member of the cartel successfully develops the new technology. Hence, with
lower individual investment amounts, they can still have higher individual expected payoﬀ
levels than they would under R&D competition.
Proposition 7 allows us to link RJV cartel size to RJV cartel performance if we impose
a weak condition on the relationship between LJ and J.
19Assumption 4
∂LJ(J)
∂J 6 0 and lim
J→∞
LJ (J) < 0.
Assumption 4 states that the returns from winning the R&D race are weakly decreasing
in the size of the RJV cartel. This assumption would be satisﬁed in many standard models
of oligopolistic competition with free entry. I nt h en e x te x a m p l e ,w ei l l u s t r a t et h i sw i t ht h e
speciﬁc case of homogeneous good Cournot competition. Additional examples can be given
using models of logit and CES demand systems.18
Example 1 Let inverse demand be given by P (Q)=1 0 0− Q.S u p p o s e t h e ﬁrms with
the new technology has a marginal cost of zero and the ﬁrms with the old technology face
MC =1 .T h eﬁxed cost of production is 9 for all ﬁrms.
For given levels of N and J, total quantity produced is
Q =
100J +( N − J)99
(N +1 )
.









in a free entry equilibrium. Note that N > J for J 6 9.H e n c e , f o r J 6 9, each cartel
member makes µ




and LJ = L. In a model with entry and exit, for J 6 9,a ni n c r e a s ei nJ has two opposing
eﬀects on the the product market proﬁts of the cartel members. While having more rivals
which have access to the new technology puts more competitive pressure on the cartel mem-
bers, it also causes more of the ﬁrms which do not have access to the new technology to exit.
The above result implies that these two eﬀects exactly balance each other.
For suﬃciently large values of J, i.e., for J>9,n oﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to partici-





− 9, strictly decreases with J.
Given Assumption 4, the following corollary follows immediately from Proposition 7.
18More generally, it can be shown that Assumption 4 would be satisﬁed in any model of Bertrand com-
petition with a separable indirect utility function or Cournot competition with a separable direct utility
function.
20Corollary 1 The members of a suﬃciently small RJV cartel invest higher amounts and
make higher proﬁts than they would under R&D competition. The members of an intermediate-
sized RJV cartel invest lower amounts and make higher proﬁts than they would under R&D
competition. The members of a suﬃciently large RJV cartel invest lower amounts and make
lower proﬁts than they would under R&D competition.
The per-ﬁrm payoﬀ to winning the R&D race, LJ, depends on the RJV cartel’s size, J.
For suﬃciently large RJV cartels such that LJ < b LJ (J),t h e s ep a y o ﬀs are lower because
the innovation is shared amongst more ﬁrms in the product market, which increases the
product market competition. Corollary 1 compares RJV cartels of various size categories
with the benchmark of R&D competition. It provides an explanation for why relatively
small RJV cartels may form - these may be more proﬁtable than larger ones. Indeed, some
large RJV cartels may be unproﬁtable because they include too many ﬁrms.
This analysis makes an important contribution to the literature since studies of coop-
erative arrangements in R&D environments generally assume that all of the ﬁrms in the
industry participate in the cooperative structure. Hence, they do not analyze the impact of
RJV cartel size on performance. An exception is Kamien and Zang (1993). Using a model
with barriers to entry and a deterministic R&D process, they ﬁnd that if the ﬁrms in an
industry form competing RJV cartels, the resulting investment level may be higher than if
all of the ﬁrms were members of the same grand RJV cartel. However, ﬁr m sa l w a y sm a k e
higher proﬁts with a grand RJV than with competing RJVs. In contrast, we ﬁnd that
smaller RJV cartels may be more proﬁtable than larger RJV cartels. The diﬀerence is due
to entry. In Kamien and Zang (1993), proﬁts are higher with a larger RJV because the
cartel members face less competition during the R&D process. In our case, having a larger
RJV does not necessarily result in less competition in the R&D process because of the free
entry and exit of outsider ﬁrms. Smaller RJVs may be more proﬁtable because although
the beneﬁts from joint proﬁt maximization are lower with a smaller RJV, each ﬁrm expects
to earn a higher amount in the product market.
Finally, we turn our attention to the impact of RJV cartels on the aggregate arrival
21rate of innovation. Since the analysis is identical to the analysis in the case of R&D cartels,
which precedes Proposition 4, we do not repeat it here. We get the following result.
Proposition 8 The aggregate arrival rate of innovation with an RJV cartel is the same as
under R&D competition.
This result diﬀers from the results in the literature with barriers to entry. In the deter-
ministic R&D literature, RJV cartels always increase the aggregate arrival rate of innova-
tion. In contrast, Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) show that with a stochastic R&D process, the
impact of RJV cartels on the aggregate arrival rate of innovation depends on the level of
spillovers and the eﬀect of sharing on industry proﬁts. Our results extend those of Miyagiwa
and Ohno (2002) by pointing out that with free entry, even if the per-ﬁrm investment level
is diﬀerent from the R&D competition level, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation remains
the same.
7 Welfare and Policy Implications
We next turn our attention to the welfare and policy implications of the cooperative R&D
arrangements that we have considered. We deﬁne welfare as the sum of consumer welfare
and producer surplus. This implies that since the ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in equilibrium,















stands for the consumer welfare level after the race ends and one ﬁrm has the new technology
for duration T. ωo, ω1 and ωn stand for the ﬂow consumer welfare when no ﬁrms, only one
ﬁrm, and all ﬁrms have access to the new technology, respectively.
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r + Jh(xJ)+( RJ − J)h(x∗)
− J · S,( 2 5 )










stands for the consumer welfare level after the race ends and J ﬁrms have the new technology
for duration T.
These expressions show that since we evaluate welfare from an ex ante perspective, the
aggregate arrival rate of innovation determines how rapidly consumers start to beneﬁtf r o m
the new technology and ﬁrms start to make proﬁts from it. Although Propositions 4 and 8
state that the aggregate rate of innovation remains unchanged with R&D and RJV cartels,
we show in the following discussion that their formation may still aﬀect welfare adversely.
7.1 R&D Cartels
Since the innovation arrives at the same time in expectation whether or not there is an
R&D cartel, we have







r + Ch(xC)+( RC − C)h(x∗)
− C · S.( 2 7 )
That is, the only diﬀerence between the welfare level with an R&D cartel and the welfare
level under R&D competition is the expected proﬁts of the R&D cartel members themselves.
This is because in both cases there is only one ﬁrm with the new technology in the market
for the duration T after the R&D race ends. This implies that consumer welfare is the same
in expectation whether an R&D cartel is formed or not.
Since we know from Proposition 5 that R&D cartels earn negative proﬁts, (27) implies
that they must be welfare decreasing. Hence, our analysis implies that in industries with
free entry, R&D cartels would never arise and antitrust policy towards them is irrelevant.
Moreover, since they always decrease welfare, it is not desirable to subsidize R&D cartels
23in order to make them proﬁtable if there are outsider participants in the R&D race. We
show in Section 8 that this conclusion may change if no outsiders choose to participate in
the R&D race.
7.2 RJV Cartels














RJ − J − R∗¢
h(x∗) Ω1
r












That is, the diﬀerence between consumer welfare with an RJV cartel and under R&D
competition is that when an RJV cartel wins the race but before spillovers occur, there are
J ﬁrms with the new technology rather than only one. Hence, from (23) and (26) we can
conclude that any proﬁtable RJV cartel is also welfare improving if ωJ > ω1.W h i l e o n e
may expect consumer welfare to be increasing in the number of ﬁrms with access to the new
technology, this may not always be the case with free entry and exit because increasing the
number of ﬁrms with the new technology causes greater exit of ﬁrms with the old technology.
Therefore, there may be fewer ﬁrms active in the product market when an RJV cartel wins
the race than when a single ﬁrm does. In general, the net eﬀect on consumer welfare of an
RJV cartel can go either way depending on consumers’ preferences and, hence, proﬁtable
RJV cartels may present a welfare trade-oﬀ between lower expected consumer welfare and
higher expected proﬁts.
This analysis implies that in industries with free entry, antitrust policy should pay care-
ful attention to consumers’ preferences and may, therefore, diﬀer between industries. This
contrasts with the policy prescriptions in the literature with barriers to entry and deter-
ministic R&D, where RJV cartels are always found to be welfare improving and, therefore,
should be allowed. Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) reach a more cautious conclusion. They ﬁnd
that it is both privately and socially optimal to form an RJV cartel if spillovers are fast
and industry proﬁts from sharing exceed those without sharing.19 In our model, however,
19In all other circumstances, they cannot guarantee that the private and social incentives to cooperate
24these two conditions together are neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the social and private
incentives for RJV cartels to coincide.
The analysis also implies that there may be a case for subsiding unproﬁtable RJV
cartels when they are welfare improving. This conclusion is a major departure from the
results in the literature with deterministic R&D and barriers to entry, where Leahy and
Neary (1997) conclude, for instance, that ‘policy intervention to encourage cooperation
is likely to be redundant whether or not it is desirable.’ In the case of uncertain R&D,
Choi (1993) and Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) do ﬁnd room for subsidizing RJV cartels. In
particular, Choi (1993) concludes that the social incentives to form RJVs always exceed
the private incentives. However, Choi’s (1993) results depend upon the assumption that
sharing results increases product market competition. Such an assumption is not necessary
for our conclusions, which are driven by the extra pressure put on members of cooperative
arrangements by entrants. Although Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) state that “there is no
guarantee that the R&D regime that the industry selects is the best for society,” they do
not identify when, if at all, government support would be desirable (p. 868). Our analysis
takes us a step closer to this, with the surprising result that subsidies may be desirable in
case of larger RJVs. Of course, not all such RJV cartels are welfare improving, but small
RJV cartels where the members invest more per-ﬁrm than they do under R&D competition
should not require support.
8 Cooperative R&D without R&D race outsiders
In the analysis above, we have maintained the assumption that some outsiders always
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter the R&D race in equilibrium. In this section, we provide some
additional insights about cooperative R&D arrangements with free entry for the case where
no outsiders choose to enter the race. We do this to address the potential concern that
cooperation between ﬁrms in the R&D race may induce the exit of outsiders and, thus,
reduce competition in the R&D race. Our results in this section show that the prospect of
will coincide.
25cooperative R&D having this eﬀect is no cause for concern.
The main diﬀerence in results from the case with outsiders concerns the aggregate rate
of innovation. Surprisingly, we show in the following proposition that without outsiders,
the aggregate rate of innovation with either an R&D or an RJV cartel must be at least as
high as it is under R&D competition. This is because if outsiders ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to
enter the race, it must be because the cooperating ﬁrms have collectively invested enough
to ensure any entry would be unproﬁtable.
Proposition 9 If there are no outsiders in equilibrium, the aggregate rate of innovation
with an R&D cartel or an RJV cartel must be at least as high as it is under R&D competition.
Proof. We present the proof for the case of an R&D cartel only since the case of an RJV
cartel is identical. Suppose not. That is, suppose there are no outsiders in the R&D race
in equilibrium and the aggregate rate of innovation with an R&D cartel is lower than that
under R&D competition. We know that ﬁrms make zero proﬁts under R&D competition
due to free entry. By Lemma 1, this implies that a proﬁt-maximizing marginal entrant must
be making a positive proﬁt with an R&D cartel. Hence, it cannot be the case that there
are no outsiders participating int h eR & Dr a c ei ne q u i l i b r i u m .
We show in Section 7 of the Appendix that most of the other results from the previous
analysis continue to hold without R&D race outsiders. In particular, we show that all
R&D cartels are unproﬁtable and their per-ﬁrm investment is less than x∗. Moreover, there
are critical values of LJ above which RJV cartels invest more per-ﬁrm than x∗ and are
proﬁtable.
The only policy conclusion that is qualitatively diﬀerent from those we reached in Section
7 is that it may be desirable to subsidize those R&D cartels which increase the aggregate
rate of innovation since they increase consumer welfare in expectation. Hence, R&D cartels
without R&D race outsiders may present a welfare trade-oﬀ between lower proﬁts and
higher consumer welfare. To the best of our knowledge, the conclusion that subsidies for
R&D cartels may be socially desirable is unique in the literature since they are always found
to be proﬁtable.
269C o n c l u s i o n
We have analyzed the eﬀects of cooperative R&D in a model of free entry with stochastic
R&D and an oligopolistic product market. Our ﬁndings account for the eﬀects of entry and
exit in R&D environments which have been missing from the literature to date. In contrast
with the results in the literature, we have shown that R&D cartels are always unproﬁtable
and never aﬀect the aggregate rate of innovation adversely in equilibrium. RJV cartels, on
the other hand, can be proﬁtable depending on their size. Similar to R&D cartels, they also
never adversely aﬀect the aggregate rate of innovation.
Both the standard approach of modelling cooperative R&D with barriers to entry and
our approach of free entry can be understood as opposite ends of a spectrum. This paper
oﬀers some guidance as to how the existing literature’s policy prescriptions may change as
entry conditions vary along this continuum. Our results indicate that it may be desirable
to subsidize R&D cartels in cases when there are no outsider participants in the R&D race.
Such a policy conclusion does not ﬁnd support in the existing literature which assumes
barriers to entry because a consistent conclusion of this literature is that R&D cartels
are always proﬁtable. The results also imply that since sharing of R&D outcomes aﬀects
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the product market after the R&D race, the consumer
welfare eﬀects of RJV cartels are sensitive to the speciﬁcation of consumers’ preferences.
Hence, the optimal antitrust treatment of cooperative R&D arrangements may be diﬀerent
for diﬀerent industries and a detailed analysis of demand may be required to determine the
appropriate policy approach. Subsidies may be desirable in cases of larger RJVs since they
are the ones which are less likely to be proﬁtable.
Future research should consider the eﬀects of input spillovers on cooperative research
with free entry. The assumption of a Poisson discovery process used in this paper may not
be appropriate for such a study because of the assumption that the research paths embarked
upon by ﬁrms are independent. If one ﬁrm’s research project beneﬁts from the eﬀorts of a
rival ﬁrm, it would seem more reasonable to assume that their instantaneous probabilities
of success should be correlated.
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30Appendix
1 Proof of Proposition 2
Let xC and xO stand for the investment levels which satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions of
the cartel participants and the outsider ﬁrms, respectively, for a given number of cartel
participants, C,a n do u t s i d e r s ,O = R − C.W e ﬁrst show that, as in the case of R&D
competition, xC and xO are both increasing in R by invoking a stability condition.
For given values of C and R,l e tG
C and H
C represent the ﬁrst-order conditions given
in (14) and (15). G
C and H
C implicitly deﬁne xC and xO. Totally diﬀerentiating and





















































.( A . 2 )
Following Reinganum (1985), we assume that the denominators of both expressions can be
interpreted as a stability condition and, hence, are positive.20











L + xO +
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> 0.( A . 4 )
Hence, we have dxC
dR and dxO
dR > 0.
It follows that for any given outsider ﬁrm, αi = Ch
¡
xC¢




also be increasing in R. Since by Lemma 1 the maximized proﬁts of an outsider ﬁrm
are decreasing in αi, we can conclude that there exists a free entry equilibrium where RC
20See p. 92 in Reinganum (1985).
31denotes the number of participants in the R&D race and all outsider participants earn zero
proﬁts.
2 Proof of Proposition 3
The ﬁrst step is to show that xC <x O. Consider the ﬁrst derivatives for the cartel’s and a
typical outsider’s optimization problems. After imposing symmetry, these are given by
e GC ≡ h0 ¡
e xC¢∙























e HC ≡ h0 ¡
xO¢∙


























,( A . 6 )
where xO and e xC stand for the equilibrium investment level of an outsider ﬁrm and any
symmetric investment level chosen by the cartel members, respectively. In equilibrium,
e xC = xC.N o t et h a t
∂
³
e GC − e HC
´
∂e xC = h00 ¡
e xC¢∙


















Moreover, e GC − e HC evaluated at the point where e xC = xO yields








< 0.( A . 8 )
Hence, whenever e GC − e HC =0 ,w h i c hm u s tb et h ec a s ei ne q u i l i b r i u m ,w em u s th a v e
xC <x O.
We next show that xO = x∗, which implies that if there are any active outsiders in the
R&D race, each member of the R&D cartel invests xC <x ∗. To see this, note that all
active outsider ﬁrms in the R&D race earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium. Hence, by Lemma 1,
an outsider ﬁrm i must face the same value of αi as it does under R&D competition. This
implies that it solves the same maximization problem as it does under R&D competition
and invests x∗ whether or not there is an R&D cartel participating in the R&D race also.
323 Proof of Proposition 6
Let xJ and xO stand for the investment levels which satisfy (19) and (20), respectively, for
a given number of cartel participants, J, and outsiders, O = R − J.W es t a r tb ys h o w i n g
that xJ and xO are both increasing in R by invoking a stability condition analogous to the
one in the proof of Proposition 2.
For given values of J and R,l e tG
J and H
J represent the ﬁrst-order conditions given in
(19) and (20). G
J and H






















































.( A . 1 0 )
Following Reinganum (1985), we assume that the denominators of both expressions can be
interpreted as a stability condition and, hence, are positive.21
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⎦ > 0.( A . 1 2 )
Hence, we have dxJ
dR and dxO
dR > 0.
It follows that for any given outsider ﬁrm, αi = Jh
¡
xJ¢




also be increasing in R. Since by Lemma 1 the maximized proﬁts of an outsider ﬁrm are
decreasing in αi, we can conclude that there exists a free entry equilibrium where RJ denotes
the number of participants in the R&D race and all outsider participants earn zero proﬁts.
21See p. 92 in Reinganum (1985).
334 Proof of Lemma 2
The free entry equilibrium investment levels and number of ﬁrms are implicitly deﬁned
by (19), (20), and (21). Let GJ, HJ,a n dZJ stand for these three conditions. Totally






















































∂xJ .S i n c e∂GJ
∂xJ < 0, ∂GJ
∂xO > 0,a n d
∂HJ
∂xJ > 0,w em u s th a v e∂HJ











∂xJ are < 0. Hence, both the numerator and denominator
of (A.13) are negative, and we have dxJ
dLJ > 0.















∂LJ ,( A . 1 4 )





The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is positive and the ﬁrst part of the second term is
negative by inspection of (17). From Lemma 1 we know that in a free entry equilibrium,
t h eo u t s i d e r sm u s tf a c et h es a m ev a l u eo fαi regardless of the value of LJ.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
dRJ
dLJ < 0 since xO = x∗ and dxJ
dLJ > 0, as established above. Hence, the second part of the
second term is negative also.
5 Proof of Lemma 3
Substituting for LJ = L
J in the ﬁrst derivative of (13) with respect to xi reveals that if
C = J, i.e., if an R&D cartel and an RJV cartel both have the same number of ﬁrms,
the per-ﬁrm investment level is the same under both types of cooperative arrangements.
Similarly, substituting for LJ = L
J in the equilibrium payoﬀ level shows that the proﬁts
are also the same under the two types of cooperative arrangements. Hence, the results for
34LJ = L
J follow from Proposition 3 and Proposition 5.
Consider now the case where LJ = L.T h eﬁrst step is to show that xJ >x O.C o n s i d e r
the ﬁrst derivatives for the cartel’s and a typical outsider’s optimization problems. After
imposing symmetry, these are given by
e GJ ≡ Jh0 ¡
e xJ¢
∙
























e HJ ≡ h0 ¡
xO¢
∙


























,( A . 1 6 )
where xO and e xJ stand for the equilibrium investment level of an outsider ﬁrm and any
symmetric investment level chosen by the cartel members, respectively. In equilibrium,
e xJ = xJ.N o t et h a t
∂
³
e GJ − e HJ
´
∂e xJ = Jh00 ¡
e xJ¢∙


















Moreover, e GJ − e HJ evaluated at the point where e xJ = xO yields
(J − 1)h0 ¡
xO¢∙









> 0.( A . 1 8 )
Hence, whenever e GJ − e HJ =0 ,w h i c hm u s tb et h ec a s ei ne q u i l i b r i u m ,w em u s th a v e
xJ >x O.
We next show that any active outsider participant in the R&D race must invest x∗.
All active outsider ﬁrms in the R&D race earn zero proﬁts in equilibrium. By Lemma
1, this implies that an outsider ﬁrm i must face the same value of αi as it does under
R&D competition. Hence, it solves the same maximization problem as it does under R&D
competition and invests x∗. This result together with the analysis above implies that if
there are any active outsider participants in the R&D race, each member of the RJV cartel
invests xJ >x ∗ in equilibrium.
To see that the RJV cartel earns positive proﬁts, note that if we hold the outsiders’
investments constant at x∗ and decrease the RJV cartel’s investment to x∗,t h eR J Vc a r t e l ’ s
35per ﬁrm proﬁts are
h(x∗) JL
r − x∗
r + Jh(x∗)+( RJ − J)h(x∗)
− S (A.19)
and an outsider ﬁrm earns
h(x∗) L
r − x∗
r + Jh(x∗)+( RJ − J)h(x∗)
− S,( A . 2 0 )
which is clearly less. However, the outsider ﬁrm would be earning strictly positive proﬁts,
since there would be fewer ﬁrms in total making the same per-ﬁrm investments as under
R&D competition. Hence, the RJV cartel would also be making strictly positive proﬁts.
Since the RJV cartel chooses xJ to maximize its joint proﬁts given the outside ﬁrms choose
x∗, it must earn even higher proﬁts in equilibrium.
6 Proof of Proposition 7
We know from Lemma 3 that when LJ = L
J, the members of the RJV earn less than they
would under R&D competition, and when LJ = L, they earn more than they would under




a b o v ew h i c ht h ep r o ﬁts with an RJV cartel of size J are higher than they are under R&D
competition and below which they are lower.
Similarly, we know from Lemma 3 that when LJ = L
J, the members of the RJV invest
less than they would under R&D competition and when LJ = L, they invest more than
they would under R&D competition. Hence, given Lemma 2, there must exist a critical




a b o v ew h i c ht h ep e r - ﬁrm investment level with an RJV cartel of size J
is higher than it is under R&D competition and below which it is lower.
To prove that e LJ > b LJ,w ee v a l u a t et h ep r o ﬁtability of an RJV cartel when LJ = e LJ and
show that it is positive. When LJ = e LJ, the RJV cartel’s equilibrium per-ﬁrm investment




r + Jh(x∗)+( RJ − J)h(x∗)
− S =0 (A.21)
36while each member of the RJV cartel earns
h(x∗) Jh LJ
r − x∗
r + Jh(x∗)+( RJ − J)h(x∗)
− S.( A . 2 2 )






r + Jh(x∗)+( RJ − J)h(x∗)
> 0 (A.23)
since e LJ >L .
7 Cooperative R&D without R&D race outsiders
In this section, we show to what extent the results stated in Propositions 3, 5, and 7 extend
to the case where no outsiders ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter the R&D race.
Proposition 10 When there are no active outsider ﬁrms in the R&D race in equilibrium,
the per-ﬁrm investment level with an R&D cartel is lower than the per-ﬁrm investment level
under R&D competition. However, R&D cartels are always unproﬁtable.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that xC <x ∗ in equilibrium. When there are outsider participants
in the R&D race, we know from Proposition 3 that xC <x O = x∗ and from Proposition
4t h a tR∗h(x∗)=Oh(x∗)+Ch
¡
xC¢
,w h e r eR∗h(x∗) is the equilibrium aggregate rate of
innovation under R&D competition and O is the equilibrium number of outsider participants
in the R&D race in the presence of an R&D cartel. Hence, as O → 0 from above, it must









For C>b C, there are no outsider participants in the R&D race. The ﬁrst-order condition









=0 .( A . 2 4 )









h00 (xC)[L + CxC]
.( A . 2 5 )
37The denominator is clearly negative because h
¡
xC¢
is concave. The numerator is equal to
zero at xC =0and is strictly decreasing in xC for all xC > 0. Hence, ∂xC
∂C < 0 for all C>b C
and we can conclude that xC <x ∗ when there are no active outsiders in the R&D race.
To show that R&D cartels are unproﬁtable when there are no outsider participants in
the R&D race, note ﬁrst that we know from Proposition 5 that as C approaches b C from
below, the per-ﬁrm proﬁt level of the R&D cartel members is negative. For all C>b C,w e







− S.( A . 2 6 )
Applying the envelope theorem, we have ∂V C
∂C < 0. Hence, CV C < 0 for all values of C such
that there are no outsiders in equilibrium.
Proposition 11 When there are no active outsider ﬁrms in the R&D race in equilibrium,
members of an RJV cartel invest higher (lower) amounts per-ﬁrm than they do under R&D









Members of an RJV cartel earn higher (lower) proﬁts than they do under R&D competition




















dLJ > 0.( A . 2 8 )
Hence, the per-ﬁrm investment level and the joint proﬁts of an RJV cartel are monotonically
increasing in LJ.
T og e tt h er e s u l ts t a t e di nt h ep r o p o s i t i o n ,w en e x ts h o wt h a tw h e nLJ = L
J,R & D
cartels invest less than x∗ per ﬁrm and are unproﬁtable, and when LJ = L, R&D cartels
invest more than x∗ per ﬁrm and are proﬁtable.
When LJ = L
J,t h eﬁrst-order condition and equilibrium proﬁt function of an RJV cartel
are identical to those of an R&D cartel of the same size. We know from Proposition 10 that
38R&D cartels invest less than x∗ per ﬁrm and are unproﬁtable. Hence, the same must be
true of RJV cartels when LJ = L
J.
When LJ = L, if there are outsider participantsi nt h eR & Dr a c e ,w ek n o wf r o mL e m m a
3t h a txJ >x ∗ and from Proposition 8 that R∗h(x∗)=Oh(x∗)+Jh
¡
xJ¢
. Hence, as O → 0
from above, it must be the case that J<R ∗. Holding LJ ﬁxed at L,l e tb J stand for the
value of J such that Jh
¡
xJ¢





For J>b J, there are no outsider participants in the R&D race. The ﬁrst-order condition









=0 .( A . 2 9 )










Jh00 (xJ)[L + xJ]
.( A . 3 0 )
The denominator is clearly negative. Since the ﬁrst-order condition implies that the numer-
ator is equal to r
J > 0,w eh a v e∂xJ
∂J > 0. Hence, we can conclude that xJ >x ∗ when there
a r en oa c t i v eR & Dr a c eo u t s i d e r s .
To show that the members of an RJV cartel earn more than they do under R&D com-
petition, note ﬁr s tt h a tw ek n o wf r o mL e m m a3t h a ta sJ approaches b J from below, proﬁts








− S.( A . 3 1 )












2 > 0.( A . 3 2 )
Hence, JVJ < 0 for all values of J such that there are no outsiders in equilibrium.
39